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Abstract— In this paper, a pricing mechanism is proposed for 
network reactive power compensation devices in competitive 
markets. The cost components of network devices are examined 
in the paper. In the proposed market, network device owners 
offer the prices for supplying or absorbing reactive power. The 
market model is settled on uniform market prices. In the study 
cases, the issues of market power are analyzed and some useful 
conclusions are obtained for the consideration of establishing a 
market mechanism for network reactive power devices. 
Index Terms—Electricity market, market power, network 
reactive power devices, reactive power, reactive power pricing. 
I.  INTRODUCTION
N power systems, sufficient reactive power need to be 
provided in order to maintain the power flow limits on 
transmission lines and voltage limits at bus bars. Unable to 
meet the demand of reactive power may cause the drop of 
voltages. The reactive power supply, as well as active power, 
is important and there is a cost associated with this supply. 
The issues about reactive power pricing mechanisms have 
been discussed since a long time ago. Among existing reactive 
power pricing methods, approach considering nodal marginal 
costs are proposed in [1,2,3]. In the approach, the nodal 
marginal cost is defined as the sensitivity of the generation 
cost to the reactive power demand. This pricing instrument 
represent operating cost – that associated with fuel costs of 
real power. Nodal pricing methods can motivate new reactive 
power investment in high-demand areas. In [4], authors have 
provided a comprehensive analysis of various costs incurred 
by providing reactive power. The costs include capital costs, 
variable costs and opportunity costs. In [5], the authors 
presented some factors that will affect the management and 
pricing of reactive power. Two pricing structures are proposed 
base on performance requirements and local market concept, 
respectively.
In the current deregulated electricity markets, reactive 
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power management and payment mechanisms vary for 
different markets. However, a fully competitive reactive 
power market has yet to emerge. At the current stage, reactive 
power provided by generators is financially compensated in 
some electricity markets. To establish a competitive reactive 
power market, it is required that both generators and network 
devices are included in the market as market participants for 
reactive power provision. As well as reactive power provided 
by generators, the reactive power provided by network 
devices should also be financially compensated for their 
services.
From the technical point view, since reactive power cannot 
be transmitted over a long distance, it should be provided 
locally according to the availability of reactive power support 
devices. In most systems, network devices are used for 
maintaining voltages and the responsibility for managing 
reactive power lies with individual local network companies. 
The network reactive power devices are usually not paid for 
their reactive power provision. A good pricing mechanism 
reflecting the investment costs and operating costs of these 
devices would encourage network companies to put more 
efforts on maintaining bus voltages.  
From the market point view, limited reactive power service 
providers in a control area may lead to the market power 
problem. A few generators located at strategic locations may 
have the power for gaming in the market. The market power 
in a reactive power market can be mitigated or eliminated by 
extending the number of participants in the reactive power 
market. A well-designed reactive power pricing mechanism 
for network devices will help to attract more participants to 
reactive power market. A good pricing mechanism will also 
encourage independent transmission companies to plan, install 
and operate reactive power compensation devices.   
In this paper, we will examine the cost components of 
network devices and propose a pricing mechanism for the 
reactive power services provided by network devices. In 
Section II the cost components for different reactive power 
devices are analyzed. In Section III, a reactive power 
settlement model is proposed to procure reactive power 
support service from both network devices and generators at 
uniform market prices. In Section IV, a case study with Cigre-
32 bus system is presented to test the market settlement, and 
the market power problems are also analyzed for the test 
system. Some conclusions are given in Section V. 
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II.  COSTS OF REACTIVE POWER SUPPORT
Generating equipment and transmission network devices 
are the two sources of reactive power support. Generation 
sources include synchronous generators and synchronous 
condensers. Transmission network sources include capacitor 
banks, reactors, static VAr compensators (SVCs), etc. In some 
systems, reactive power supplied by generators is classified as 
one of the ancillary services provided by generation 
companies, while the reactive power supplied by transmission 
devices is classified as one of the transmission services 
provided by network companies.  
Reactive power equipment in a power system have 
different characteristics in terms of dynamics and speed of 
response, ability of voltage changes, capital costs, operating 
costs and opportunity costs. For example, synchronous 
generators are very fast reactive power support devices, but 
have high operating and opportunity costs. Capacitor banks 
are slow and have poor performance but are cheap to install 
and operate. Static VAR compensators have fast response 
speed, but the ability to support voltages is poor and drops 
with the square value of voltage. The cost for Static VAR 
compensators is between that for generators and capacitors. 
Usually, capacity banks provide base requirement of reactive 
power, and the capacities of other fast equipment are reserved 
for further reactive power needs. In the following subsections, 
we will analysis the costs of reactive power provided from 
different sources. 
A.  Costs of reactive power support from generators 
The cost for a generator to provide reactive power can be 
divided into three cost components: availability cost, 
operating cost and opportunity cost.  
The capacity of a generator is used to produce not only 
active power, but also reactive power. Therefore, the capital 
cost of a generator should be considered in reactive power 
cost analysis as well as in real power cost analysis. Here, the 
term availability cost component of reactive power represents 
the capital cost of the generator capacity used to produce 
reactive power.
When a generator provides or absorbs reactive power, the 
real power losses in field windings will increase. The cost of 
increased real power losses is the operating cost component of 
reactive power provision. Unlike the fuel costs that represent 
the operating cost of active power production, operating cost 
for reactive power support is small.  
The capability of a synchronous generator to supply or 
absorb reactive power is restricted by its capacity constraints, 
which are armature current limit, field current limit and 
underexcitation limit [6]. If the generator operates on the 
limiting curve, any increase in Q will require a decrease in P 
to satisfy the winding heating limits. This means that the unit 
has to reduce its real power output when higher reactive 
power output is required. The loss of revenue due to the 
reduction of real power is termed as opportunity cost for 
providing reactive power [7]. Opportunity cost is a significant 
issue in reactive power cost analysis. In the electricity markets 
of New York and Australia, opportunity costs of reactive 
power are financially compensated to generators in case of 
revenue lost due to the requests of increasing reactive power. 
B.  Costs of reactive power support from transmission devices 
Transmission network devices, such as capacitor banks and 
SVCs, are usually required to control voltages through the 
network. Different devices act in different ways for voltage 
control and reactive power support. In transmission or 
distribution networks, when reactive power compensation is 
required, shunt capacitors and reactors are connected or 
switched to the system. These devices provide reactive power 
by modifying the network characteristics. On the other hand, 
SVCs supply or absorb reactive power automatically to 
maintain voltage levels when it is needed. 
The reactive power costs from capacitor banks are mainly 
due to the capital costs and operating costs of the devices. The 
operating costs are often with small values. Since capacitor 
banks are switchable devices and have limited numbers of 
switching operations, each switching operation corresponds to 
a depreciated capital cost [5]. We can see that capital cost is 
the main portion of the total cost of providing reactive power 
from a capacitor bank.  
Compare to capacitor banks, SVCs have better regulating 
characteristics and faster response speeds following a 
disturbance. Because of their fast response speed, SVCs are 
more effective than capacitors for preventing transient voltage 
instability. In steady-state conditions, SVCs are used to 
maintain the desired output, say, Qset, which is often set to be 
close to floating output so that rapid capacitive boost is 
available for disturbances [8]. On the other hand, SVCs are 
more expensive than capacitor banks. A good way of voltage 
control for a network company is to have a mixture of reactive 
power facilities with both capacitor banks and SVCs. Shunt 
capacitors can be used first to satisfy unity power factor 
operation of nearby generators, then, some SVC capabilities 
are reserved for system disturbances.  
In [8], some cost data is provided for reactive power 
compensation equipment in an existing substation. It shows 
that, the installation costs of shunt capacitors depend on 
voltage levels, and there is not much difference in operating 
costs for capacitors with different voltage levels. The 
operating costs of SVCs are around 10 times bigger than that 
of shunt capacitors. The installation costs of SVCs relate to 
many factors, such as configuration and complexity of the 
SVC system. 
III.  REACTIVE POWER MARKET MODEL
In our previous work [7, 9, 10], some market issues about 
reactive power provided by generators have been studied. A 
reactive power procurement method is proposed in [7] to 
maximize the societal advantages considering generators’ 
reactive power bids and sensitive factors. In [9], a market 
model for reactive power provided by generators has been 
proposed. In the model, only generators are paid for their 
reactive power support services. Reactive power cost of a 
generator is composed of three components: availability cost, 
operating cost, and the opportunity cost. Corresponding to the 
three cost components, generators bid for availability 
payment, operation payment and opportunity payment. In the 
localized reactive power market for generators that we 
proposed in [10], we noticed that there are a few strategic 
buses in a control area where a reactive power provider will 
have immense market power.  
In this section, we will propose a reactive power market, in 
which network devices are also included as market 
participants and are paid for their reactive power support 
services. Furthermore, we will discuss the issues of mitigating 
and eliminating market power in a local reactive power market 
by extending market participants. 
A.  Reactive power bidding for network devices 
In deregulated electricity markets, the ISO might not know 
the cost information of all reactive power equipment. To 
establish a reactive power payment mechanism, an option is to 
call for bids from all market participants willing to provide 
reactive power.
As discussed in Section II, the reactive power costs for 
network devices comprise capital cost components and 
operating cost components. The operating costs for network 
devices are small compare to capital costs. The capital costs 
for static var compensation systems and capacitor banks are 
different. Normally, it is more expensive to build static VAr 
systems than install capacitor banks.    
We propose a two-part bidding structure for network 
devices. Corresponding to the capital cost components and 
operating cost components, network devices bid for 
availability payment bi and operating prices vi for the 
quantities of reactive power supplied or absorbed from the 
system. The bidding structure is shown as in Fig. 1.  
Payment 
bi
vi
vi
QmaxQmin QC
Payi
Fig. 1.  Reactive power bidding structure for transmission network devices. 
As shown in Fig. 1, device owners bid for both supplying 
and absorbing reactive power. If a device ‘i’ is selected for 
reactive power support, it will be paid for the availability 
payment bi plus the operating payment vi*QC,i, where QC,i is 
the quantity of reactive power supplied. Thus, by providing 
QC,i, device ‘i’ ask for a payment Payi as following: 
Payi = bi + vi * QC,i
We should note that the availability payment represents the 
capital costs of devices. Capital cost is an annualized number 
and it is further divided into a day’s or an hour’s scale.     
B.  Market settlement model 
In a competitive reactive power market, the owners of 
transmission network devices and generators are the 
participants of the market. In the market, both generators and 
network companies submit their price offers to the ISO for 
reactive power provisions. Generators submit their three-part 
offer prices base on availability payment, operating payment 
and opportunity payment [9]. Network companies submit 
price offers for their devices base on availability payment and 
operating payment, which has been discussed in Section III-A. 
The ISO will calculate uniform market prices for generators 
and network devices base on all offer prices and reactive 
power requirement. The market uniform prices are obtained 
for generators and network devices, separately. The market 
participants are paid with the uniform prices. 
We propose an OPF based optimization approach for 
market settlement. The objective of the approach is to 
minimize the total payment to generators and network 
companies. The reactive power market settlement is subject to 
network constraints. 
    1)  Objective function 
The objective is to obtain the uniform market prices to 
minimize the total payment to generators and network 
companies. 
Minimize ??
??
?
genj
j
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i GenPayCapPay  (1) 
Where,  
i, j index for buses 
cap index for network VAr device at a bus 
gen index for generator at a bus 
CapPay payment for network device 
GanPay payment for generator 
The payment for network devices i, CapPayi, includes two 
components, availability payment and operating payment, as 
shown in (2). 
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In (2), ?c0 and ?c1 are the uniform availability price and 
uniform operating price, respectively, obtained for the 
capacitors and SVCs in the network. The uniform prices are 
decided by the offer prices of the last device being selected to 
satisfy reactive power requirement. If a device is selected to 
provide reactive power, it will be paid for uniform availability 
payment. In addition, operating payment will be paid for the 
supplied quantity of reactive power at the uniform operating 
price.
The second term in (1) is the payment for generators for 
their reactive power provision. It is described as (3). The 
payment to generators shall depend on the market price of the 
three components of reactive power, being offered by the 
providers. Reactive power output from a generator is 
classified into three components: Q1, Q2 or Q3, in 
corresponding to availability payment, operating payment and 
opportunity payment respectively. Accordingly, only one of 
the binary variables W2 and W3 can be selected. In (3), ?g1 is 
the uniform availability price, ?g2 is the uniform operating 
cost while ?g3 is the uniform opportunity price. If a provider is 
selected, W1 will be 1 and it will receive the availability price 
irrespective of its reactive power output. 
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The principle of highest-priced offer selected determining 
the market price, is applied with additional system constraints. 
The system constraints are as follows: 
    2)  Constraints 
? Load flow constraints 
? ????
j
ijijijjiii YVVPDPG )cos( ???  (4) 
? ??????
j
ijijijjiiii YVVQDQCQG )sin( ???  (5) 
PG real power generation at a bus. 
QG Reactive power support by generator at a bus. 
QC Reactive support from network devices at a bus. 
PD real power demand at a bus. 
QD Reactive power demand at a bus. 
V Voltage at a bus 
Y Element of network admittance matrix 
? Angle associated with Y 
? Reactive power limits for network devices: 
iiiMin QCQCQC max,, ??  (6) 
? Reactive power constraints for generators 
iii QQQG 32 ??  (7) 
? Determining the uniform market prices for network 
devices: 
The following constraints ensure that the market prices 
?c0 and ?c1 equal to the highest offer price that has been 
accepted.
0cii bU ???  (8) 
1cii vU ???  (9) 
Where, Ui is an integer variable. If the device at bus i is 
selected to provide reactive power, Ui=1. Otherwise, 
Ui=0.
? Market price limits for generators 
1,1,1 ??? ii aW  (10) 
? ? 2i,2i,3i,2 mWW ????  (11) 
3i,3i,3 mW ???  (12) 
geniWWW iii ???? ,3,2,1  (13) 
Where, a1 is the availability price offer of generator, m1
is the operating price offer, and m3Q is the opportunity 
price offer [9]. 
? Reactive power limits for generators 
? Bus voltage limits 
IV.  CASE STUDY
The Cigre 32-bus test system is used to examine the 
proposed market settlement. As reactive power market is a 
local market, the system is separated into three local control 
areas according to electrical distance, as shown in Fig. 2 [10]. 
We have found in [10] that there are some strategic buses in 
Zone A. The generators located on the strategic buses held 
market power to raise the uniform market prices of Zone A. 
Fig. 2.  CIGRE 32-bus test system network configuration. 
In this section, we will first test the proposed reactive 
power market settlement for network devices and generators. 
Then, we will examine the effect of market power mitigations 
by introducing more network devices to reactive power 
market. Four study cases are simulated to examine the 
proposed reactive power market. 
A.  Base case 
In the base case, only generators are paid for their reactive 
power support services. With the system shown in Fig. 2, 
uniform market prices are obtained for generators in Zone A, 
Zone B and Zone C, respectively. The brief simulation results 
are shown as in Table I. The second row of the table gives the 
payment to Zone A, B and C respectively. The third and forth 
rows show whether market power exist in a zone and which 
generator held market power. It is found in the base case that 
generator on bus “4072” held market power in Zone A. That 
means, Zone A has to buy reactive power from generator 
“4072” even if the generator offer a high price, thus the 
uniform prices of Zone A are raised by generator “4072”. 
TABLE I
BASE CASE
Zone A B C 
Payment for each zone 19.78 4.29 2.07 
Market power exists? Yes No No 
The generator that hold 
market power 
Bus 
4072
__ __ 
B.  Case-1:add more network devices to eliminate market 
power 
In this case, we add more reactive power providers to 
examine the possibility of eliminating market power. Assume 
that additional network VAr devices are installed on bus 
“4071”, “4012”, “4021” and “4042”. In this study case, the 
network VAr devices are assumed providing free reactive 
power, and there is no payment for network devices. The 
followings are found in the simulation. The generator on bus 
“4072” no longer has market power. In the simulation, if the 
offer price of generator “4072” increases, generator “1013” 
will replace “4072” and become new price setter. If the offer 
price of “1013” increase, generator “4011” will be price setter. 
We can find that no generator held market power after 
introducing more VAr devices to provide reactive power.  
The obtained reactive power scheme for network device on 
each bus is given in the fifth column of Table III. 
C.  Case-2 and Case-3 
In Case-2, some numbers within a given range are used to 
represent the offer prices of availability price bi and operating 
price vi. The offer prices are shown in the third and fourth 
column of Table III. The information about payment and 
market power of Case-2 is given in Table II. Compare Table II 
with Table I, we can see that the market power in Zone A is 
eliminated by introducing network devices into reactive power 
market. The payment to Zone A is reduced significantly, and 
the payments to zone B and Zone C keep the similar level. 
TABLE II
CASE-2 
Zone A B C 
Total payment 4.25 4.84 2.92 
Market power exists? No No No 
In Case-3, we reduce the value of bi to 1/5 of that in Case-2 
to test the situations with different availability offer prices. 
The reactive power schemes of network devices obtained from 
Case-1, Case-2 and Case-3 are listed in the 5th, 6th and 7th
column of Table III, respectively.  
From Table III, we can find the following: 
? In Zone A, Zone B and Zone C, those devices with lower 
offer prices have the priorities to be selected. The amount 
of reactive power scheduled for a device will decrease 
when its offer price increase. 
? In Zone B and Zone C, the reactive power schemes and 
selections for network devices don’t change much with 
offer prices change, because these two zones have 
sufficient balanced reactive power sources. 
? In Zone A, reactive power supplied by network devices 
can help to eliminate market power. If a network device 
offer higher price, it may not be selected by the market. 
TABLE III
OFFER PRICES AND REACTIVE POWER SCHEMES FOR 
CASE-1, CASE-2 AND CASE-3 
Offer bids Reactive power 
Device
on bus i bi vi Case-
1
Case-
2
Case-
3
4071 0.49 0.11 0.25 0 0.26*
4012 0.75 0.18 1.00 0 0 
Zone
A
1013 0.51 0.07 1.01 1.01* 1.01 
4021 0.59 0.22 0 0 0 
4042 0.53 0.19 0.58 1.00 1.00 
1022 0.56 0.11 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Zone
B
1021 0.84 0.30 0 0 0 
4051 0.66 0.16 1.00 1.00 1.00 
1043 0.82 0.20 0.27 0.18 0.18 
4043 0.86 0.33 2.00 1.14 1.11 
4046 0.50 0.10 1.00 1.00 1.00 
1041 0.84 0.17 1.13 0.52 0.51 
1044 0.55 0.21 2.00 2.00 2.00 
Zone
C
1045 0.61 0.22 1.21 1.23 1.23 
V.  DISCUSSIONS
From the results of above case studies, we consider to 
classify control areas according to their VAr sufficiency into 
two types: VAr balanced areas and VAr unbalanced areas.
The two types of areas can be defined as following: a) For a 
VAr balanced area, sufficient reactive power sources are 
located reasonably within the area. The reactive power 
exchanges with other areas are small, and the reactive power 
flows within the area are small. b) For a VAr unbalanced area,
the reactive power flows within the area and the exchanges 
with other areas are big. There exists market power within the 
VAr unbalanced area. 
In our study cases, Zone A can be classified as VAr 
unbalanced area. Zone B and Zone C can be classified as VAr 
balanced areas. We can get the following conclusions about 
reactive power market in VAr balanced area and VAr 
unbalanced area. 
? In a VAr balanced area, the offer price change of a 
network device mostly will not change the market 
selection of VAr devices. Only the quantities of reactive 
power schemes may be changed for those devices with 
high offer prices. 
? In a VAr unbalance area, whether a device can be 
selected for reactive power provision is very sensitive to 
the prices offered by the device owners.  
VI.  CONCLUSIONS
This paper develops an auction based pricing mechanism 
for the reactive power provided by network devices. The price 
offered by network reactive power devices are based on 
availability cost component and operating cost component. 
Reactive power market uniform prices are obtained for 
network devices. From the analysis of the results, we found 
the following conclusions. In an area with balanced reactive 
power sources, an auction mechanism has less effect on the 
reactive power schemes of network devices. In an area that 
reactive power sources are not balance located, a VAr auction 
mechanism will help the ISO to decide the most economic 
reactive power schemes, and to minimize the payment. 
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